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Abstract
The authors examine several issues in teaching phenomenology (1) to advanced researchers who
are doing qualitative research using phenomenological interview methods in disciplines such as
psychology, nursing, or education, and (2) to advanced researchers in the cognitive
neurosciences. In these contexts, the term “teaching” needs to be taken in a general and nondidactic way. In the case of the first group, it involves guiding doctoral students in their
conception and design of a qualitative methodology that is properly phenomenological. In the
case of the second, it is more concerned with explaining the relevance of phenomenology to an
audience of experimental scientists via conference presentations or published papers. In both
cases, however, the challenge is to make clear to the relevant audience what phenomenology is
and how it can relate to what they are doing.

The teaching of phenomenology can take several
forms. For example, in an undergraduate course on
phenomenology it is possible to focus on the
philosophical origins of phenomenology and its
development across a number of authors. This
approach contains many problems and issues for
exploration. In studying Husserl’s phenomenology,
for example, we can note in his work the constant
repetition of beginnings and re-statements about how
to do phenomenology. The Cartesian approach gives
way to the psychological approach, which gives way
to the lifeworld concept. In this way, static
phenomenology gives way to genetic phenomenology. It would also seem that a clear
transcendentalism gives way, at various points, to an
emphasis on embodied experience. In a graduate
course one can pursue issues of Husserlian
scholarship that demand close analysis of Husserl’s
texts. Alternatively, it is possible to focus on the early
connections between analytic philosophy and
phenomenology, and their later contentious divorce.

One could wrestle with the various transformations
that phenomenology undergoes in the existential
writings of Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty.
One could also trace the influence of phenomenological ideas through various post-phenomenological
thinkers and movements such as Levinas, Derrida,
and the postmoderns. In all of these approaches there
is no shortage of controversial issues to explore.
A different way to teach phenomenology is to focus
on the phenomenological method and its applications.
There is, of course, also some history involved here.
However, the focus may be more pragmatic than
scholarly. For example, one could explore phenomenology by looking at its interdisciplinary uses. This
could include the use of the phenomenological
concepts of Alfred Schutz (1932/1967) in sociological
analysis or the work of Roman Ingarden (1931/1973)
on aesthetics and literature. Another possibility would
be to trace the development of phenomenological
psychology and the contemporary use of phenomeno-
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logy in qualitative research. The focus could also be
on the recent employment of phenomenology in the
cognitive sciences, a combination that has given a
boost to the currency of phenomenological
philosophy.
In this short paper we examine issues in regard to
teaching phenomenology (1) to advanced researchers
who are doing qualitative research using phenomenological interview methods in disciplines such as
psychology, nursing, or education, and (2) to
advanced researchers in the cognitive neurosciences.
In these contexts, the term “teaching” needs to be
taken in a very general and non-didactic way. In the
case of the first group, what it involves is attempting
to guide PhD students in their conception and design
of a qualitative methodology that is properly
phenomenological. In the case of the second group, it
is more a matter of explaining the relevance of
phenomenology to an audience of experimental
scientists via conference presentations or published
papers. In both cases, however, the challenge is to
make clear to the relevant audience what
phenomenology is and how it can relate to what they
are doing.
Phenomenology and Qualitative Research
PhD students in psychology, education, nursing,
business and other disciplines are frequently
searching for good methods for doing qualitative
research. They often come to phenomenology without
any knowledge of phenomenological philosophy, or
sometimes without any background in philosophy at
all. One part of the task of teaching phenomenology is
therefore to provide them with enough of a
background so that they have a good understanding of
some basic concepts, along with some of the technical
terminology. In some cases, they get over-enthusiastic
about using the technical terms and overdo it to the
point of become obscure. It is important to cure them
of this inclination. This kind of overuse and misuse of
terminology is truly part of a bad practice that
assumes that certain disciplines have solved all of the
problems surrounding these concepts. It fails to
recognize that there are often continuing disputes and
debates about most of these concepts.
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subjects reflect an improvement, and in what
way?
It is important to provide the students with a good
understanding of what “lived experience” means and
to help them devise a good set of interview questions
that will access that lived experience. Students will
often devise questions that ask the subjects about how
they think of specific things in their life. These
students equate the subjects’ opinions or thoughts
about their life with their lived experience. This goes
entirely against the spirit of the phenomenological
epoché, which calls for a suspension, not only of the
investigator’s theories and pre-conceived opinions,
but also of the subjects’ theories and pre-conceived
notions regarding their own lived experiences. What a
subject thinks about something is not the same as his
or her experience of that phenomenon. In the
phenomenological court, so to speak, only certain
things count as evidence, and theory, opinion, or
hearsay are not accepted. An investigator needs to
learn how to teach or lead his or her subjects to report
their lived experiences.
A researcher who was studying how certain physical
practices shape people’s lives, proposed the following
question:
Why did you think that coming to this training
centre would resolve the issue?
This question actually directs the subject away from
his or her lived experience and asks instead for his or
her opinion. In order to steer the researcher towards a
more phenomenological inquiry, we suggested the
following:
At this point you might ask the subjects to
describe what their experience around this
issue was like. How did it make them feel?
How pervasive was it in their life? Was it just
a nagging issue in the background, or was it
taking over their everyday experience? In what
way? Can they provide an example? Was it
purely an internal issue, or did it affect the way
they experienced others, or the world?
The researcher also included the following question:

Once they have some background and some sense of
the concepts and issues, the primary question is how
they can use phenomenology to do their research.
This can take numerous forms, but one way is to work
primarily with the process of the phenomenological
interview. The research questions (in contrast to the
interview questions) usually take the following forms:
What effects does a certain intervention have
on the lived experience of subjects?
Do the changes in the lived experiences of the

How do you feel that this issue has been
addressed through the practices here?
We suggested:
Have the practices changed you? If so, can you
describe that change, and can you give me an
example from your everyday life of how this
practice has changed you?
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All of the questions were modified in this way. We
were concerned about two things: firstly, accessing
the subjects’ experience rather than their thoughts
about their experiences, and, secondly, accessing as
much detail about their experiences as possible. In
order to accomplish this, it is essential that the
questions are phrased in such a way as to help the
subjects to focus their answers on the faithful
description of their experience.
Our thinking about this kind of phenomenological
interview has been influenced by Claire Petitmengin
(2006, 2009) and the work of Depraz, Varela and
Vermersch (2003). Petitmengin (2006, 2009) provides
a set of clear and rigorous instructions regarding
setting up the interview. She highlights the fact that,
during the interview process, it is easy to drift away
from the precise description of lived experience and
to start providing reasons or theories about the
experience. The task of the interviewer is to bring the
subject back to the lived experience.
Petitmengin’s (2006, 2009) focus highlights an aspect
of phenomenological interviewing that is not often
mentioned. In reading Husserl or his commentators, it
is possible to get the impression that performing the
phenomenological reduction is a first step, and that
once this step is taken we are suddenly in a different
(transcendental) realm where we can proceed with the
phenomenological work. However, it is important to
recognize that the phenomenological reduction is a
constant task that needs to be renewed throughout the
research process. The researcher must work to stay
within the phenomenological attitude (see Gallagher
& Zahavi, 2008).
Petitmengin (2006, 2009) provides extremely useful
guidelines for the interviewer regarding the setting,
and how to encourage the subject to pay attention to
lived experience without introducing biases. The use
of open questions – questions that do not include preconceived concepts – is important in this regard.
Instead of asking “Was this a painful experience?”,
the question should simply be “Can you tell me in
some detail what was involved in this experience?”
The interviewer can also help the subject simply by
repeating her own words back to her. This process
can result in clarifications being made. The subject
can also be helped to identify and focus on a
particular feeling, even if she does not have a word to
express it, simply by providing a deictic reference to
it, such as “this strange feeling you just mentioned”.
These are a few of the guidelines mentioned by
Petitmengin (2006, 2009), building on the work of
Natalie Depraz (2004) and Pierre Vermersch (1994).
These interview techniques have been applied in
specific studies of epilepsy by the Varela group in
Paris.
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Phenomenology and Pedagogy
Teachers, educators and researchers all conduct a
form of practical work, namely teaching itself, which
is directly related to ordinary life. In order to do this
they require practical tools. It is also not possible to
act from an educational point of view without having
a theoretical framework that enlightens the pragmatic
goals and ethical perspectives of the work. For more
than half a century, phenomenology has maintained a
stable and productive relationship with education
(Tarozzi & Mortari, 2010), both in a theoretical and in
a practical manner. There is a long tradition of
“Phenomenological Pedagogy” or “Phenomenological
Education” both in Europe and in North America.
Within these approaches one finds interest in different
roles that phenomenology can play in education and
the social sciences in general. Most broadly, within
Europe, phenomenology is generally viewed as a
philosophy of research, while in the social sciences
developed in North America phenomenology is
mainly seen as an empirical approach aimed at
exploring subjectivity and people’s lived experience
(Mortari & Tarozzi, 2010).
This paper investigates some ways in which
phenomenology can be useful to the educational field.
It also investigates ways of teaching phenomenology
to educators and educationists. We provide just a few
suggestions about two main points that can be
considered for teaching phenomenology to such
groups, including PhD students in the education field.
These two points concern, firstly, the awareness of
one’s own mind (taking care of the mind) (Mortari
2002), and secondly, some strategies for planning
research using a phenomenological method.
Two points need to be mentioned in relation to the
first concern: cultivating an awareness of our mental
posture and the mental dynamics that are to be found
in our experiential relationship with the world. Firstly,
the essence of phenomenology is found in its practice.
In this regard, the proper question is not “What is
phenomenology?” but, instead, “How do we do
phenomenology?”. This question requires an answer
on the pragmatic level. From an educational point of
view, phenomenology should be seen as a way to
educate our perspective on reality, to reflect on our
relationship with the world, to change and refine our
point of view, to build and define our mental posture,
and to broaden the way we look at the world (Tarozzi
& Mortari, 2010). Phenomenology should not be seen
as a retreat into introspection that treats consciousness
or experience as an isolated phenomenon. Instead,
due to the fact that phenomenology emphasizes the
intentionality of consciousness, it is about our
relationship with the world.
Secondly,

because

phenomenology

focuses

on

The IPJP is a joint project of the Humanities Faculty of the University of Johannesburg (South Africa) and Edith Cowan University’s Faculty
of Regional Professional Studies (Australia), published in association with NISC (Pty) Ltd. It can be found at www.ipjp.org
This work is licensed to the publisher under the Creative Commons Attributions License 3.0

Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology

Volume 12

experience in-the-world, it puts the teacher in a
position to recognize his or her own epistemic
responsibility. It is of fundamental importance that
teachers and students become aware of, and take
responsibility for, their perspectives on the world.
Phenomenology therefore offers teachers a way to
reflectively take into regard their own points of view,
and their own way of conducting their relationship
with the things of the world. Within the relationship
“consciousness-of-something”, the subject has an
ethical and noetic responsibility for his or her own
role, a responsibility for the posture of his or her own
mind. The mind, inevitably dynamic, depends on our
self-awareness and knowledge, and the role of the
subject in the knowing process is something that can
be improved through taking care of the mind.
In relation to strategies for educational research and
the use of the phenomenological method in such
research, it is important to consider the specific
relationship between the scope of the experience
under investigation and the scope of the question(s)
used to investigate that experience. For example, if
the topic under investigation is the subjective
experience of wine tasting, or, alternatively, the role
that drinking wine plays in the life of the subject, the
appropriate time-span of experience needs to be
considered. This includes determining whether it can
be a short time-span of experience, as in the case of
wine tasting, or whether a longer time-span is called
for, as in the case of examining the effects of a lifepractice like drinking wine.
Moving beyond the question of time-scale, it becomes
clear that some cases require a focused and relatively
structured inquiry on the specific experience, which
may be sensory (as in the case of wine tasting),
motor, emotional, or cognitive. Other cases (as in the
examination of drinking practices) require an open
question on the broader experience (for example:
“Describe your personal experience with wine during
your life”). The level of structure and complexity of
these questions should be the object of discussion
within the research group and should be directly
related to the aims of the research.
From a phenomenological point of view, there are
other important issues concerning analysis of
experience in the field or the re-creation of the
experience in the laboratory. These issues include
asking subjects to describe a specific experience
immediately after the experience itself, or recalling
past experience that may have been forgotten.
Phenomenology can involve a mix of strategies
related to the study design. For example, through
focusing simply on factors that involve the temporal
scope of the experience and the related scope of the
interview question, it is possible, depending on our
interests, to combine them in ways defined across
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four possibilities: (a) long-term experience and open
question; (b) long-term experience and focused
question; (c) short-term experience and open
question; and (d) short-term experience and focused
question. These strategies may help to reduce the
“temporal distance” of the experience and allow the
investigator to ask about something that is still
present in the subject’s mind (both in short-term and
in middle-term memory). Such strategies allow
researchers to manipulate the space for interpretation
of the experience as well as for narrative practices
that may improve phenomenological description.
Some brief examples are provided below.
Long-Term Experience/Open Question
This strategy is typically used for the investigation of
pathologies or diseases and their etiology, specifically
concerning autobiographies. For example, this
strategy could be used to investigate the experience of
people who are alcohol-addicted in order to discover
when, how and (possibly) why they started to drink in
a pathological manner and the way in which they
have lived with this pathology. This is the tradition of
phenomenological psychiatry, and is derived from the
Swiss psychiatrist Ludwig Binswanger. In relation to
education, the use of this combination can assist in
understanding the pedagogical challenges involved in
teaching pathological subjects, as well as providing a
way in which to approach the study of wide-temporal
experiences in the purely educational field. A good
example of a phenomenological study of long-term
temporal experience and open questions is the
research conducted by Mortari and Sità (2010)
concerning the relationship between professors and
parents in schools.
Long-Term Experience/Focused Question
In the same way, it is possible to investigate a large
temporal window of experience with a high degree of
specificity by using a more structured question. A
therapist, for example, may make use of the following
prompt: “Think about your entire experience of
alcohol use, and try to describe what happened only
during those times when you were drinking at home
with your children there with you but without their
mother. Try to give as much detail as you can about
those specific moments”. Alternatively, in a purely
educational context, the researcher might be
interested in investigating the role played by some
specific courses of study – for example, only the
courses about north-east Italian red wines – on the
entire wine-experience of the tasters. A specific
course may have changed the student’s ideas about
wine partially or completely. Here the question could
be: “Could you describe the effects of the wine course
on red Italian wines on your general experience of
wine?”
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Short-Term Experience/Open Question
This type of research is particularly difficult, as there
is a risk that, based on a specific stimulus, the subject
may start to create theories or thoughts that are not
relevant with respect to the experience under analysis.
However, this combination is often used in
educational research on metacognition, where the
researcher is interested in meaning-building or sensemaking about a specific and short experience or
stimulus, such as a movie, a song, an art work, or a
specific bodily movement. There is thus a welldefined – spatially and temporally – experience, and
the use of an open question therefore allows the
subject to give a broader sense to his own experience
with reference to his life. This strategy includes a
phenomenological-hermeneutical research approach
(see Van Manen, 1990, for a description of this
approach in education research), where the subject’s
interpretation of the experience is more important
than the description of the experience itself. For
example, something as simple as a glass of wine can
be an experience deep enough to produce a
metacognitive effort aimed at creating a meaningful
interpretation. In this example, the subject may be
asked to talk not only about the experiential
properties of the wine, but also about memories that
emerge as a result of the taste or colour of the wine.
Short-Term Experience/Focused Question
The last combination is a good fit for experimental
work within the cognitive sciences. In the cognitive
sciences, the role of hic et nunc experience (such as
visual perception of shapes, or aural perception of
notes or songs) may be important, and researchers are
sometimes interested in analyzing a precise stimulus
with focused questions. For example, a research study
could be designed to focus on a change in the
immediate experience of wine tasting caused by
taking a course for wine-tasters. The research can be
conducted in either the field or a laboratory. Subjects
may all be required to taste the same wine and
immediately afterwards describe their own experience
in a detailed way. In this case, the report may be
focused more on the description of the experience
than on its interpretation. If the experience is
repeated, with subjects divided into groups based on
whether or not they have taken a specific course, the
question has to be the same for everyone and must be
well-defined: “What precise tastes do you experience
in this wine?” In this example, the wine experience
for every subject has to be a short experience, and the
question and the answer have to be focused on and
restricted to the emergence of the experience, with the
goal of discovering how the particular course has
changed the experience of the wine.
To conclude this section, it is necessary to underline
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the importance of a new approach to educational
issues that can involve the phenomenological
perspective, namely the dialogue between the
education sciences and cognitive neuroscience
(Fischer et al., 2007; Francesconi, 2009). Although
this “mixed-area” is relatively new, it deserves further
exploration by scholars of education sciences.
Various important research centres are already
investigating this field (e.g., the Harvard Graduate
School of Education, the Teachers College at
Columbia University, the School of Education at
Cambridge University, and the Centre for BioEducation at the University of Naples), and scholars
in the education sciences cannot ignore this research.
The next section focuses on the way in which
phenomenology may be integrated into this research.
Phenomenology and Cognitive Science
Francisco Varela (1996; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch
1991) was one of the first researchers to suggest that
phenomenological methods were of positive
importance for empirical work in the cognitive
sciences, and especially in experimental settings that
involve neuroscience (see also Gallagher, 1997;
Gallagher & Varela, 2003; Petitot, Varela, Pachoud,
& Roy, 1999). Prior to that point, phenomenology
was already being used for critical purposes in
cognitive science in order to identify areas that
cognitive science was unable to address (see e.g.,
Dreyfus, 1972; 1992). Varela’s suggestion that
phenomenology can play a more positive role in
cognitive science research would necessitate a
transformation not only of phenomenology but also of
cognitive science. In order to achieve this aim, the
conceptualization and application of phenomenology
need to be taught to two very different audiences – to
empirical scientists, and (perhaps surprisingly) to
phenomenologists themselves.
Teaching Phenomenology to Phenomenologists
While teaching phenomenology to phenomenologists
may sound both presumptuous and paradoxical, what
is implied is that phenomenologists themselves have
to be made aware of all of the various possibilities
offered by phenomenology. Many phenomenological
philosophers, for example, have been happy to let
analytic philosophers of mind engage in the work of
cognitive science, and to instead focus their own
attention on the textual and historical scholarship of
phenomenology. This latter work is vitally important,
but it should not involve ruling out the actual
application of phenomenology in various contexts,
even if these contexts involve the transformation of
phenomenology. One of the main issues in this regard
concerns the naturalization of phenomenology, or
exploring various ways in which phenomenology can
be integrated with empirical science.
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Husserl was well known for his critique of naturalism,
and especially of positivistic, scientistic definitions of
knowledge. However, Husserl was also concerned
about providing a sound basis for doing science – and
this includes empirical science. This is because
scientists need to be conscious in order to do their
work – they can only do their work by relying on
what consciousness delivers to them – and therefore a
science of consciousness (i.e. phenomenology) must
be the first science, and it must be a transcendental,
in other words non-empirical, science. Transcendental
phenomenology was therefore defined in contrast to
natural, empirical science. Doing transcendental
phenomenology is clearly not the same thing as doing
empirical science. However, “in contrast to” does not
mean “in opposition to”. Although Husserl was
opposed to scientism, he was not opposed to science.
Indeed, it would be a perversion to think that Husserl
would not want the insights of phenomenology to be
used in empirical investigations. Husserl (1931/1970)
himself suggested that “every analysis or theory of
transcendental phenomenology, including the
transcendental theory of the constitution of an
objective world – can be produced in the natural
realm, when we give up the transcendental attitude”
(§57). It is therefore feasible to suggest that, after
pursuing the phenomenological and transcendental
reductions, and working out our phenomenological
insights, we can adopt a naturalistic attitude and take
those insights into the empirical sciences to see how
they play out. This last step should not be seen as
“doing phenomenology”, and phenomenologists
should not object to it, given that it may lead to
important applications of phenomenology.
While some phenomenologists do not object to
phenomenology’s positive influence on the cognitive
sciences as described above, they do resist the idea of
what Varela termed “mutual constraints” (1996).
Although phenomenology may be able to inform
cognitive science, surely cognitive science cannot
constrain phenomenology. For example, whatever I
may learn about the brain, this cannot change the
experience that I describe as a phenomenologist. This
suggests that neuroscience can never improve
phenomenology. Perhaps, if phenomenology were
just pure description, then more knowledge about
how the brain works would not help in the doing of
phenomenology. However, phenomenology has never
been just pure description. Both Husserl and MerleauPonty (who is a good model of a phenomenologist
who learned from the empirical sciences) always
positioned their descriptions as informing a
phenomenological philosophy that may include
argument and theory, as well as description (see
Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008).
A phenomenologically informed philosophical claim
may therefore be constrained by empirical science.
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The term “constraint” in this case does not necessarily
have a negative connotation. Science can both
confirm and question phenomenological insight. For
example, recent neurological discoveries about
canonical neurons (neurons that are activated when I
reach to pick up a tool and when I simply see the tool)
in the premotor cortex can substantiate claims about
kinaesthetic correlations of perception made by
Husserl in his 1907 lectures on Ding und Raum
[Thing and Space]. At the same time, science could
place limits on the kinds of claims that
phenomenologists would be able to make about the
detail and exhaustiveness of their descriptions. For
example, experiments on change blindness and
inattentional blindness – respectively, the inability to
notice changes that occur even when looking directly
at the changing scene (Grimes, 1992), and the
inability to see obvious things because we are
attending to something else (Simons & Chabris,
1999) – should make phenomenologists consider
what they can and cannot claim about the scope of
experience. It seems quite possible that I am in-theworld, to use Heidegger’s term, in ways that I cannot
grasp solely through phenomenological insight.
Teaching Phenomenology to Cognitive Scientists
There are several ways that cognitive scientists can
use phenomenology. These include the use of
phenomenology to guide the construction of nonrepresentationalist models relevant for use in artificial
research. In this respect, Dreyfus, Varela, and others
have had some positive effect on AI, showing why
computational models cannot work, and suggesting
more embodied and dynamical approaches. The focus
of this paper is, however, more specifically on how
phenomenology can contribute to experimental design
in behavioural and neuroscientific studies.
One of the first tasks involves overcoming a serious
misconception about phenomenology – that it is a
purely subjective form of introspection. Dennett
(1991, 2001) has misconstrued phenomenology in this
way. Instead, it is important to explain to cognitive
scientists that phenomenology actually provides a
methodologically controlled alternative to simple
reliance on introspective reports (see Gallagher &
Overgaard, 2005; Noë, 2006). This is apparent in
Varela’s (1996) proposal, which he terms neurophenomenology, and which involves using an explicit
phenomenological method in the experimental
situation.
The classic example of a neurophenomenological
experiment was conducted by the Varela group (Lutz,
Lachaux, Martinerie, & Varela, 2002) when they
trained subjects in phenomenological method in order
to guide their reflections on lived experience during a
perceptual task. The method involved three distinct
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steps: (1) the epoché – setting aside preconceived
ideas and theories; (2) the reduction – turning of
attention towards the experience itself; and (3)
intersubjective verification. Some of the steps
outlined by Petitmengin (2006, 2009) were used to
develop a set of “phenomenological clusters”. Based
on the subjects’ own reports in response to open
questions during pre-tests, the subjects generated their
own vocabulary that the experimenters then used to
define response categories for use during the main
perceptual tasks. The phenomenological reports were
then correlated with objective brain and behavioural
measures that showed high correlations between
specific brain dynamics, behavioural reaction times,
and phenomenological reports on attention. This
experiment demonstrated that cognitive scientists
could learn something new (specifically about
common subjective distractions that occur during
experimental testing) by using phenomenology.
Related experiments have been conducted regarding
the lived experience associated with epileptic seizures
(Petitmengin, 2010; Petitmengin, Navarro, & Le Van
Quyen, 2007).
Thus, Francisco Varela’s (1996) conceptualization of
neurophenomenology is a new tool that can be used
by cognitive scientists in the study of perceptual
consciousness. However, it is not necessarily a
procedure that can be used to study non-conscious
behaviour or certain pathologies that would prevent
the subjects from learning or employing the
phenomenological method. The notion of “frontloading phenomenology” (Gallagher, 2003; Gallagher
& Zahavi, 2008) may therefore be a useful alternative
in other studies. In this research method, subjects do
not have to learn phenomenological method, nor do
they have to do phenomenology during the
experiment. Rather, scientists make use of
phenomenological insights and distinctions (either
developed by phenomenologists, or developed during
the course of neurophenomenological experiments) to
inform their experimental design.
One example of this can be found in a series of
experiments on the neural correlates of the sense of
agency (Chaminade & Decety, 2002; Farrer & Frith,
2001; Farrer et al., 2003). These brain imaging studies
employed a phenomenological distinction between
sense of agency (SA), defined as the experience of
causing or controlling an action, and sense of
ownership (SO) for movement, defined as the sense
that it is I or my body that is moving (Gallagher,
2000). These two aspects of experience are
differentiated on the basis of reflex or involuntary
movements, such as when one is pushed from behind.
In such cases, there is SO (a sense that it is my body
moving), but there is no SA for the initial movement.
The researchers designed various experimental tasks
based on this distinction, such as asking subjects to
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control the movement of an icon on a computer
screen. In some cases the subjects actually controlled
the cursor, while in other cases they did not control
the cursor. For example, a study by Farrer and Frith
(2001) showed that SA correlated with activation in
the anterior insula, an area responsible for the
integration of a number of sensory-motor signals.
This suggests that activation of the anterior insula is a
neural correlate for SA.
Mutual Enlightenment
Another result of these experiments, however, may be
of more interest to phenomenologists. The original
context for developing the phenomenological
distinction between SA and SO involved arriving at
an explanation of schizophrenic delusions of control
in which there is SO for the bodily movement, but no
SA. In other words, these delusions involve a
disruption of SA (which, at the neurological level,
may involve a disruption of processes in the anterior
insula). The way in which this problem was described
in the literature on schizophrenia (see especially Frith,
1992) led to the phenomenological distinction of SA
and SO being framed in terms of motor control
(Gallagher, 2000). However, Chaminade and Decety
(2002) and Farrer and Frith (2002) introduced a
different dimension of SA by focusing on the
intentional aspect of an action. This concerns the
sense that my action is making a difference in the
world – for example, the sense that I control what
happens on the computer screen. More generally, the
experiments suggested that SA is connected to the
effect our action has on the world – whether our goals
or intentions are actually accomplished. This goes
beyond thinking of SA simply in terms of motor
control, and suggests that the phenomenology is more
complex than portrayed by the initial SA/SO
distinction.
This research suggests two things regarding the issue
of mutual constraints. Firstly, even if the original
phenomenological description of SA and SO was
adequate in the context of explaining delusions of
control – or at least adequate to answering some
specific questions about such delusions – the
experiments, which were conducted in other contexts,
suggest that perhaps the original phenomenology was
not fully adequate to the phenomenon of agency.
Secondly, and more generally, it suggests that
phenomenological investigations may be constrained
by the particular questions they attempt to answer. In
this regard, the science seems capable of raising the
same kinds of questions that hermeneutics raises with
regard to phenomenology and the traditional claim of
a presuppositionless method. Thus, in the example
above, scientific experiments, even when starting
with a phenomenological distinction, were able to
offer a different insight into SA – namely, that it
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includes not only motor control aspects, but also
intentional aspects pertaining to accomplishing a goal.
If this aspect was not included in the original
phenomenological distinction, then the science should
send us back to the phenomenological drawing board.
In other words, this is a good example of how
phenomenology can offer valuable insights to
empirical science, and how empirical science can also
suggest further phenomenological refinement.
It would be possible to argue that the original
phenomenological analysis was inadequate to begin
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with. This is indeed the case, and may be a result of
the particular problem that was addressed. However,
no phenomenologist can lay claim to a perfect or
universally adequate phenomenological description.
Empirical science can thus act as a constraint on the
real practice of phenomenology. Stated more
specifically, it is possible that empirical science can
point to the inadequacy of a particular phenomenological analysis. However, from a more positive
perspective, this suggests that phenomenology and
cognitive science can offer each other some mutual
enlightenment (Gallagher, 1997).
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